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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the landmark decision Loving v. Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting interracial marriages violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because they
served the impermissible purpose of maintaining white supremacy.' The
Commonwealth of Virginia had argued that, because the law equally
punished whites and blacks, it did not illegitimately single out African
Americans for discriminatory treatment. 2 In striking down the statute, the

*
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1.
See 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2.
See id. at 7-8.
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Court rejected the notion that the equal application of miscegenation
laws made them consistent with equal protection.3
The Court, however, never adequately addressed an apparent flaw in
its reasoning. According to conventional understandings of how white
supremacy operates, laws promoting white supremacy are supposed to
invidiously discriminate against blacks while benefiting whites. But how
can miscegenation laws promote white supremacy and the interests of
whites if the laws actually restrict their fundamental right of association
and punish them if they cross racial boundaries? Was the Court
contending that miscegenation laws promoted white supremacy in spite
of their incidental effects on the individual rights of whites?
This Article will argue that miscegenation laws functioned to
promote the supremacy of the white race by, paradoxically, deliberately
regulating and restricting the liberty of white individuals. Segregationists
feared that some whites, particularly women and children, wanted to
relate to blacks as social equals. Without legal restrictions on the
associational rights of whites, segregationists feared that blacks would
gain social equality and freely enter into equal intimate relations-and
ultimately marriages-with them. This would result in more interracial
families, and inevitably end in the creation of a nation of a "mongrel
breed of citizens."4
This Article contends that segregationist justifications for
miscegenation and segregation laws shows that those laws effectively
imposed a legal duty on whites to adhere to cultural norms of endogamy.
Dominant social groups enforce rules of endogamy-the cultural practice
of encouraging people to marry within their own social group-to protect
the dominant status of their individual members and of the social group
in general. Thus, laws prohibiting interracial marriages regulated white
desire in order to protect the dominant status of whites as a group. The
Loving Court, therefore, ultimately was correct in declaring that
miscegenation laws denied blacks equal protection.
Part II of this Article discusses miscegenation laws and the Loving
decision. It contends that the Court understood that miscegenation laws
operated to protect white supremacy, but that it failed to adequately
explain how such laws did so. Part III argues that the primary rationale
used to justify these laws was the protection of the purity of the white
race. Part IV will explain these laws' history and demonstrate that
segregationists enacted and supported them to ensure that whites
practiced endogamy. Part V concludes by reexamining the Loving
decision in light of this Article's analysis.

3.
4.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
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LOVING V. VIRGINIA

In Loving, the Supreme Court had to determine whether laws
banning interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The
case involved an interracial couple who challenged their conviction
under Virginia's Racial Integrity Act.6 The Act made it a felony for a
white person to intermarry with a "colored person"7 and rendered any
such marriages void. 8 While the statute required that a white person
marry only another white person, it permitted members of nonwhite
races to freely marry members of other nonwhite races. 9 The statute also
prohibited interracial couples from marrying outside the state and then
living in Virginia as a married couple. 10 Mildred Jeter, an African
American woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, had violated the
statute by getting married in Washington D.C. and then later returning to
Virginia. 11
Decided in 1967, Loving was a foregone conclusion. The case was
decided at the height of the civil-rights movement when the Court was
poised to put some teeth into Brown v. Board of Education 12 and impose
a duty on segregated school districts to racially integrate their schools. 13
The Court could have decided the constitutionality of miscegenation
laws as early as 1955, shortly after it decided Brown. In Nairn v. Nairn, a
Chinese sailor challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's Racial
Integrity Act, contending that his marriage had been improperly annulled
solely on the basis that it was between a white person and a Chinese
person. 14 The Court, wanting to avoid handing down another potentially

5.
See id. at 2.
6.
See id. at 2-3, 6.
7.
Id. at4 (quoting VA.CODE ANN.§ 20-59 (1960)).
8.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57.
9.
See id. § 20-54.
10.
See id. § 20-58.
11.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
12.
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools
violated equal protection).
13.
See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (holding that
segregated school districts had an affirmative duty to dismantle racial segregation "root
and branch").
14.
See 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955); see also Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled
Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HlST.
119 (1998) (examining the historical context of the decision).
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controversial decision so soon after Brown, 15 dismissed the case on
jurisdictional grounds. 16
By 1967, however, the Court was clearly ready to further alter the
status quo in the South. 17 Nonetheless, miscegenation laws posed
difficult doctrinal questions-questions that the Loving Court failed to
adequately address. With respect to its equal protection analysis, the
Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment compelled the
invalidation of laws that banned interracial marriages because such laws
violated "the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 18 The
Court reached its conclusion by first formulating the contours of modern
equal protection suspect-class analysis. 19 It noted, without much
explanation, that certain racial classifications, especially those used in
criminal statutes, are suspect and must be "subjected to the 'most rigid
scrutiny. "'2 For a suspect racial classification to be upheld, it "must be
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate."21
The Court began its strict scrutiny analysis by identifying Virginia's
purported interests in prohibiting interracial marriages. The Court
referred to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Nairn v. Nairn and
noted that Virginia's interest was "'to preserve the racial integrity of its

°

15.
See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking
in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. l, 61 (1979) (citing STEPHEN L. WASBY
ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER (1977)).
16.
See Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); see also Dorr, supra note 14, at
120.
17.
See Dorr, supra note 14, at 159 ("The radical restructuring of American
political and social mores occurring throughout the 1960s created the ideological room
for-maneuver necessary for a successful constitutional challenge to the Racial Integrity
Act.").
18.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. l, 12 (1967).
19.
See id. at 11.
20.
Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). In
explaining why such racial classifications are suspect, the Court quoted from its opinion
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. In that
case, the Court declared that racial classifications are "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. The
Court, however, failed to explain why or how certain racial classifications are "odious to
a free people." Moreover, it is important to note that, in Loving, the Court never stated
that all laws that rely on racial classifications are suspect. Rather, it qualified its statement
by noting that particular racial classifications in particular contexts are suspect. See
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. The qualified nature of the Court's suspect-classification analysis
is important because it is clear that the Court did not mean that all racial classifications,
whether invidious or benign, are necessarily suspect. Thus, the actual reasoning in Loving
does not speak to, for example, whether race-conscious affirmative-action programs
should be subject to same level of scrutiny used to analyze Jim Crow laws.
21.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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citizens,' and to prevent the 'corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of
citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride . . . . ,,m The Court
concluded that those purposes were "obviously an endorsement of the
doctrine of White Supremacy"23 and held that "restricting the freedom to
marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause." 24
The Court also held that miscegenation laws violated substantive
due process by infringing on the Lovings' fundamental right to marry. 25
It declared that "marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival."26 Moreover, denying
that fundamental right on the basis of race deprived "all of the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law." 27 The Court concluded
that "[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State."28
While the Court's analysis in Loving was cursory and superficial, it
is difficult to contest its conclusion. The Court's reasoning, however,
failed to adequately answer several important questions. First, the Court
did not explain why miscegenation statutes that punished whites as well
as blacks should be subject to strict scrutiny. 29 Virginia argued that
because the law punished all violators equally, it did not deny blacks the
equal protection of the laws. 30 The Court ultimately rejected the equal
application argument by declaring that punishing whites and blacks
equally did not make the law nondiscriminatory. 31 It reasoned that such
laws, because they employ racial classifications, are still suspect. 32 This
answer, however, begs the question: why should a racial classification
that does not solely target a discrete and insular minority be suspect?33
The Court cited the Japanese internment decision Korematsu v. United

22.
Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 12.
25.
See id.
26.
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 10.
30.
Id.; see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (holding that a
fornication statute imposing greater penalties on an interracial couple than on a same-race
couple did not violate equal protection because it punished blacks and whites equally).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
31.
32.
See id. at 11.
33.
See United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(arguing that strict judicial scrutiny is appropriate when a law discriminates against a
discrete and insular minority).
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States 34 to justify its application of strict scrutiny. In Korematsu,
however, the racial classification was deemed suspect because the
government singled out a racial minority and deprived only that group of
their civil liberties. 35 This was not the case in Loving.
Second, the Court also failed to satisfactorily explain how a law that
restricted whites' fundamental right to marry promoted the supremacy of
whites. Miscegenation laws restricted the fundamental right of
association for whites as well as blacks. Moreover, the law arguably was
even more restrictive of white liberty, given that members of nonwhite
races were free to marry a person outside of their race as long as that
person was not white, while whites could only marry within their race. 36
III. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE PURITY OF THE WHITE RACE:
SOCIAL EQUALITY THROUGH INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE

For segregationists, the goal of miscegenation and segregation laws
was to protect the purity or integrity of the white race. 37 As the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Rice v. Gong Lum declared, "To all
persons acquainted with the social conditions of this state and of the
Southern states generally it is well known that it is the earnest desire of
the white race to preserve its racial integrity and purity ...." 38 The court
observed that the Mississippi State Constitution prohibited interracial
marriages only between whites and racial minorities. 39 The court also
asserted that "[ w]hen the public school system was being created it was

34.
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese
imprisonment during World War II).
35.
See id. at 216.
36.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
37.
See id. at 50 (arguing that "racial segregation is necessary to preserve
[white 1racial integrity").
38.
Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11-12 (asserting that Virginia's miscegenation statute was designed to protect
white supremacy because it required whites to marry only other whites but freely
permitted members of different minority races to intermarry one another). Although
proponents of Jim Crow sometimes talked about the desire to protect the integrity of all
races through miscegenation and segregation laws, they ultimately were concerned about
protecting the purity of the white race. See Gong Lum, 104 So. 110 ("Race amalgamation
has been frowned on by Southern civilization always, and our people have always been
of the opinion that it was better for all races to preserve their purity. However, the
segregation laws have been so shaped as to show by their terms that it was the white race
that was intended to be separated from the other races."); Lisa Lindquist Dorr, Gender,
Eugenics, and Virginia's Racial Integrity Acts of the 1920s, 11 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 143,
144 (1999) (noting that Virginia's 1924 miscegenation law purported to protect integrity
of all races but the statute only defined whites and did not prohibit interracial marriages
between different racial minority groups).
39.
Gong Lum, 104 So. at 108.
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intended that the white race should be separate from all other races.',,io
Accordingly, it concluded that the clear "dominant purpose" of those
provisions "was to preserve the integrity and purity of the white race."41
It then held that a Chinese American child could not attend any school
designated for white children, because her exclusion was necessary to
protect the purity of white children. 42
In protecting the purity of the white race, segregationists ultimately
sought to protect the physical and cultural superiority of the white race
from being degraded through social mixing and breeding with inferior
races. 43 Segregationists believed that interracial breeding or the
"corruption of blood" would ultimately lead to the mongrelization of the
white race. 44 Segregationists feared this because they believed it would
not only mean the destruction of a physically distinctive white racial
group, but also of the superiority of the white race. For example, even
though Justice Harlan's Plessy v. Ferguson dissent contented that
segregation on passenger trains denied blacks their civil equality, he still
believed that the white race was socially superior: "The white race deems
itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage ...
,,45

Segregationists were not as optimistic as Justice Harlan; they feared
that the dominance of the white race would end if the purity of the white
race could not be protected. Relying on eugenics, segregationists
believed that the superior genetic traits-and therefore the superior
culture-of the white race would be degraded through breeding with
inferior races. 46 Once the population transformed into an inferior
"mongrel breed of citizens," the characteristics of white civilization in
the United States would slowly disappear. Thus, to ensure the continuing
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 110.
THEODORE BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE: SEPARATION OR MONGRELIZATION
43.
56-57 (1946) (arguing that whites are superior to blacks and that "the mingling of the
superior with the inferior will result in lowering of the higher"); see also Lindquist Dorr,
supra note 38, at 145-46 (contending that many southerners at the turn of the twentieth
century accepted eugenicist belief that interracial breeding "would result in future
generations" of whites "dominated by 'inferior' racial characteristics."); Dorr, supra note
14, at 124 ("American eugenicists generally, and Virginians particularly, argued for the
scientific defense of civilization through racial purity, using their theories about race
mixing.").
44.
BILBO, supra note 43, at 56 (arguing that efforts to dismantle segregation in
the south would "plunge Dixie into hopeless depths of mongrelism.").
45.
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46.
See Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at 145-46; Dorr, supra note 14, at 124.

470

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

dominance of the white race, it was absolutely vital for segregationists to
protect its purity. 47 Segregationists believed that the key to preventing the
corruption of blood was to deny the black race social equality. 48
Former U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo contended that the only way to
protect the purity of the white race was to prevent "the two races from
49
meeting on terms of social equality." It was only through social
segregation that the white southern race was able to deny social equality
to blacks and stop the "southern white man" from becoming "submerged
in the black mass about him." 50
Bilbo contrasted the white South's success with the failure of whites
to maintain racial purity in South America. He noted that, after the
Spaniards had conquered the native peoples of South America, instead of
"expelling them as the English did in North America, they ruled over
them and married their women." 51 As a result, Bilbo explained, South
America became mongrelized and suffered from societal degradation. 52
Bilbo contended that denial of social equality allowed the white
southerners, unlike the Spaniards, to preserve their racial purity. 53 lf
whites were to grant social equality to blacks, however, the inevitable
result would be tragic:
lf we sit with Negroes at our tables, if we attend social
functions with them as our social equals, if we disregard
segregation in all other relations, is it then possible that we
maintain it fixedly in the marriage of the South's Saxon sons
and daughters? The answer must be "No." By the absolute
denial of social equality to the Negro, the barriers between the
races are firm and strong. But if the middle wall of the social
partition should be broken down, then the mingling of the tides

47.
See BILBO, supra note 43, at 56-57.
See, e.g., id. at 54 ("To preserve her blood, the white South must absolutely
48.
deny social equality to the Negro ...."); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1120 (1997) ("[Alfter the Civil War, white Americans of widely varying political
views reiterated their conviction that emancipating African-Americans entailed granting
the freedmen some form of legal equality, but assuredly did not require granting them
'social equality."'); see also Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three
Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1689, 1696 (2005) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that blacks were not "full social equals with whites").
BILBO, supra note 43, at 54.
49.
See id.
50.
51.
Id. at 52.
See id.
52.
53.
See id. ("Let anyone who doubts the wisdom of racial segregation or fails to
understand the South's loyalty to the color line make a study of conditions in South
America.").
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of life would surely begin. It would be a slow process, but the
result would be the same. And though the process be gradual, it
would be none the less irresistible and inevitable. . . . [T]he
southern white race, the southern Caucasian, would be
irretrievably doomed. 54
To fully understand white concerns about social equality, it is
necessary to understand how Americans thought about racial equality in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 55 During that period,
Americans broke down racial equality into three distinct concepts: civil
equality, political equality, and social equality. 56 Civil equality required
the acknowledgment of "those rights exercised by economic man, such
as the capacity to hold property and enter into contracts, and to bring suit
to defend those rights in the legal system."57 When the framers enacted
the Fourteenth Amendment, they made civil equality a constitutional
guarantee. 58
Political equality included "the right to vote, the right to serve on
juries, and the right to hold political office."59 Essentially, achieving
political equality meant having the right to participate equally in
democratic self-governance. While the Fourteenth Amendment was
understood to protect civil rights, there was some debate as to whether it
also protected political rights. 60 The Reconstruction Congress therefore
ratified the Fifteenth Amendment to guarantee African Americans the
"political right of voting." 61
Social equality "concerned whether persons [of different races] were
considered social equals in civil society."62 Obtaining social equality

54.
Id. at 55.
55.
For discussions about how nineteenth-century Americans conceptualized
equality, see Siegel, supra note 48, at 1119-28; Balkin, supra note 48, at 1693-1701.
See Siegel, supra note 48, at 1119-20.
56.
Id. at 1120; see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694 ("[C]ivil equality meant
57.
equal rights to make contracts, own, lease, and convey property, sue and be sued, and,
according to some formulas, the rights of freedom of speech and free exercise of
religion.").
See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1696 ("[T]he basic assumption of most of the
58.
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was that ... [e]quality before the law
simply meant civil equality, nothing more."); Siegel, supra note 48, at 1120. There had
been some dispute about whether "the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery
vested Congress with the power to define and protect civil rights," so Congress ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that Congress had the constitutional authority to
protect the civil rights of African Americans. See id. at 1121.
See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694.
59.
See Siegel, supra note 48, at 1121.
60.
61.
Id.
62.
Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694.
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meant achieving the same status as whites, primarily through interracial
associations based on mutual respect and esteem. 63 Thus, a black man did
not achieve social equality if he associated with a white man as his
servant. 64 However, if a white man invited a black man to his home as
his dinner guest, such an association signified mutual respect, and
through the association, the black man achieved social equality. 65
Segregationists believed that whites should never relate to blacks as
social equals. 66 They believed treating blacks as if they had the same
social status as whites was like granting "equality for unequals."67 Thus,
even a middle-class black person was considered socially unequal to a
working-class white person, solely because of the black person's
membership in an inferior racial group. For segregationists, a black
person's low social standing was defined not by personal attributes or
accomplishments, but by the collective accomplishments and traits of the
black race. 68
Even though they believed that it was a universal truth that blacks
did not deserve social equality, segregationists feared that some white
persons could and would act to grant "equality for unequals" by relating
to blacks with respect and affection. Specifically, they feared the
possibility of whites granting blacks social equality by marrying them. 69
The threat posed by interracial marriages was considered so dangerous
that segregationists sought to prevent their formation through legal
prohibition and through the racial segregation of social spaces.
To understand why, it is necessary to discuss the concept of
endogamy. 70 Social groups which adhere to norms of endogamy do so to

63.
See id. at 1695 (defining social equality as "the product of natural affinities
and private social interactions").
64.
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1050
(1995) (arguing that during Jim Crow, whites associated with blacks when doing so
preserved the "status hierarchy they desired").
65.
See Steven A. Bank, Anti-miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of
Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 3 I 3 (1995) (noting that white people viewed social equality as
"private mixing" or the "right to come into my parlor and be my guest").
66.
See BILBO, supra note 43, at 58 ("The South will not grant to the Negro race
social equality with the whites.").
67.
ld. at 90.
See id.
68.
69.
See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694-95 (arguing that whites feared thatl
interracial marriages would alter hierarchical status relationships between whites and
blacks).
70.
ROBERT K. MERTON, intermarriage and the Social Structure: Fact and
Theory, in INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
LITERATURE, AND LAW 473, 475 (Wemor Sollors ed., 2000).
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varying degrees. Some may prefer but not require that their members
marry within the group, and there often is some intermarriage. 71 Thus, in
the United States, while socioeconomic classes prefer that their members
practice endogamy, it is a flexible preference that permits intermarriage
between socioeconomic classes. 72
However, sociologist Robert Merton contends that in a racial-caste
society marked by extreme social stratification, "the endogamous norms
are rigid." 73 The dominant racial group in a racial-caste society like the
Jim Crow South strictly enforces endogamy among its members to
reinforce its superior position. 74 They do so because it is a highly
effective tool in preserving the racial identity and distinctiveness of its
members, which helps to maintain the stability and power of the racial
group.
Thus, during Jim Crow, because whites justified their superior
position in the racial hierarchy solely on their whiteness, they strictly
enforced endogamy. Whiteness has both physical and social components,
and endogamy helped to preserve both aspects by operating as the
"genetic mechanism" for preserving the biological identity of its
members, and as the "institutional mechanism" for regulating
membership and inculcating white racial consciousness. 75
As a genetic mechanism, endogamy produced and reproduced the
shared physical attributes that define the white race and its members.
Thus, through the production of identifiably white children, endogamy
ensured that the physical attributes of whiteness were passed from one
generation to the next. 76 In contrast, if whites were permitted to marry
nonwhites, such marriages would destabilize whiteness by producing
legitimate children who bore the physical marks of "the lower caste,"
thereby blurring the physical distinctions justifying the social
stratification between the races. 77
As an institutional mechanism, endogamy regulated membership in
the white race. Across cultures, marriage is a means of social mobility. 78
A person of a lower social class moves up in social standing by marrying
an upper-class person. 79 In the Jim Crow context, in order for blacks to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 481.
See id. at 482 ("Class endogamy is loosely preferential, not prescriptive.").
Id. at 483.
Id.
See Kingsley Davis, Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 AM.

376, 394 (1941 ).
Davis, supra note 75, at 394.

ANTHROPOLOGIST

76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See

id.

Merton, supra note 70, at 482.
Davis, supra note 75, at 377.
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achieve the same racial social status as whites, they would have to marry
whites. Enforced endogamy among whites, however, effectively
prevented blacks from using marriage to achieve social equality by
gaining membership into the dominant group.
Interracial marriages were inherently incompatible with the racial
caste system and, if permitted, they would "undermine the very basis of
the caste order."80 If interracial marriages were permitted, then nonwhites
would be granted membership and the white race would no longer be
white. In essence, interracial marriages would redefine the identity of the
white racial group, making it impossible to maintain a racial-caste
system. 81 In segregationist terminology, interracial marriages would
destroy and transform the white race into a mongrel breed of citizens.
Segregationists therefore understood that interracial marriages had to be
"strictly forbidden or racial caste abandoned." 82
Endogamy also functioned as an institutional mechanism to instill
white racial consciousness and group solidarity. 83 First, it fostered social
connections among whites. 84 A marriage brings the families of the
spouses together, and endogamy ensured that the new kinship relations
created by marriage socially connected two whites families. 85 Second,
endogamy ensured that the children were socialized solely in white
cultural norms. 86 Third, endogamy reinforced white racial consciousness
by reinforcing social differences between whites and blacks. 87 The legal
and cultural norm of endogamy communicated to whites that they should
not intermarry because blacks were genetically and culturally inferior to
whites. 88
In-group marriages ensured that all the powers and privileges that
whites enjoyed remained exclusively with whites. As Professor Cheryl
Harris has argued, whiteness was a valuable form of property: "White
identity conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits and was
jealously guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those who met

80.
See id. at 389.
81.
See id. ("To permit intermarriage would be to give the hybrid offspring the
legal status of its father, and would soon undermine the very basis of the caste order.").
82.
Id.
83.
See Merton, supra note 70, at 483.
See id.
84.
85.
See id.
86.
See Davis, supra note 75, at 378.
87.
See Merton, supra note 70, at 483.
88.
See BILBO, supra note 43, at 198 (arguing that blacks and whites should not
"amalgamate" or intermarry because blacks are physically, mentally, and morally inferior
to whites).
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a strict standard of proof." 89 By being a member of the white race, a
person obtained rights, privileges, power, material wealth, and status. 90
Thus, during the Jim Crow era, whites had access to superior political
power, facilities, accommodations, and schools. 91 Endogamy ensured
that blacks could not obtain those privileges indirectly through a white
spouse or parent.
The racially ambiguous nature of the children of interracial
marriages threatened to destabilize Jim Crow-a social system based on
classifying and physically organizing people on the basis of their race.
Where would interracial families fit in a social system that created places
only for whites or blacks? Where would an interracial family sit when
they dined at a segregated restaurant? Would the husband and wife have
to sit at different tables? What about the mixed-race children? Would
there have to be a separate section for them? Would they bave to attend a
mixed-race school? The entire project of racially segregating social
spaces would be extremely difficult-if not impossible-if interracial
marriages became commonplace.
Given the threat interracial marriages posed to white supremacy, the
solution seems fairly obvious. Theoretically, for two people to get
married, both partners must consent. So, even if blacks sought to destroy
the white race through intermarriage, whites could defeat such a strategy
by refusing to marry blacks. But if the white race could be preserved by
simply having individual whites refrain from marrying blacks, why did
Jim Crow states feel compelled to pass laws prohibiting interracial
marriages? Because they feared that white individuals would not
necessarily comply with informal cultural norms of endogamy. 92 In other
words, they feared the power of white desire to destroy whiteness and
white supremacy.

89.
(1993).
90.
91.
92.

See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1726
See id. at 1713.
See id. at 1766.
See BILBO, supra note 43, at 55.
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IV.

MISCEGENATION AND SEGREGATION LAWS AND THE LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF WHITE RACIAL ENDOGAMY

A.

The Enforcement of White Endogamy Norms During and After
Slavery

Laws enforcing white endogamy have a long history in America. 93
American miscegenation laws of the late nineteenth and twentieth
century have their roots in laws enforcing interracial sexual relations and
marriage dating back to the early colonial era in North America. 94
Prior to the Civil War, such laws were enforced primarily against
white offenders. 95 In a study of racial-purity laws in colonial and
antebellum Virginia, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham and Barbara K.
Kopytoff concluded that "all of the statutes dealing specifically with
voluntary interracial sex prescribe[d] punishment for the white partners
only,"96 and "did not punish blacks at all for marriage or for voluntary
sexual relations with whites.'m For example, a 1691 Virginia statute
prohibiting interracial marriages required that the white partner be
banished but did not mention any punishment for the black partner. 98
Scholars offer several explanations for why early miscegenation
laws did not punish blacks. During slavery, there were other mechanisms
to control and regulate the behavior of slaves.99 Moreover, because many
of the black offenders were slaves, there actually was an economic
incentive not to punish them too harshly-if the statute required that the
black partner also be banished from the colony, the slave's master would
lose the services of the slave. 100

93.
See Davis, supra note 75, at 394 ("[I]n those societies where racial castes
have arisen there were strong currents against intermarriage from the start").
94.
See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 38 (Cal. 1948) (Schenk, J.,
dissenting); RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 17-22 (2001) (discussing interracial relationships during the colonial period);
generally Judy Scales Trent, Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany:
The Targeting Process, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 272 (2001).
95.
See Randall Kennedy, The Enforcement of Antimiscegenation Laws, in
INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE,
AND LAW, supra note 70, at 140, 144-45; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K.
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum
Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1968 (1989).
96.
Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 95, at 2000.
Id. at 1968.
97.
98.
See id. at 1995.
99.
See id. at 1994 n.126.
100. See id. at 2000; see also Jason A. Gillmer, Poor Whites, Benevolent
Masters, and the Ideologies of Slavery: The Local Trial of a Slave Accused of Rape, 85
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An understanding of endogamy, however, suggests that early
miscegenation laws punished only whites because their primary purpose
was to ensure that whites adhered to norms of endogamy. As Professor
Randall Kennedy argued, prior to the Civil War, officials punished only
whites because they "were the ones responsible for protecting the purity
of their bloodlines." 101
After the Civil War and the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the nature and enforcement of miscegenation laws
changed dramatically, as segregationists took to enforcing miscegenation
laws much more vigorously. 102 They now punished both the white and
black partners. 103 Further, Kennedy argues:
With the traumatic abolition of slavery ... and the even more
unsettling assertions of civil and political rights by blacks
during Reconstruction, southern whites suffered a tremendous
blow to their collective, racial self-esteem. Many compensated
by insisting relentlessly upon an exacting observance of formal
and informal rules of racial caste. The result in many places
appears to have been an enhanced criminal enforcement of
.
. 1aws .... 104
nuscegenatton
The problem for Jim Crow states, however, was that the discourse of
racial equality not only was influencing blacks to assert their new rights,
but it was also influencing or had the potential to influence whites to
accept black demands for full equality.

N.C. L. REV. 489, 492-93 (2007) (arguing that, during slavery, white male reactions to
charges that a slave raped a white woman were nuanced and did not always engender
knee-jerk hostility and aggression towards the accused slave).
101. Kennedy, supra note 95, at 144-45.
102. See id.; see also MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN 1-2 (1997)
("Under the institution of slavery ... white Southerners could respond to sexual liaisons
between white women and black men with a measure of tolerance; only with black
freedom did such liaisons begin to provoke a near-inevitable alarm, one that culminated
in the tremendous white violence of the 1890s and after.").
103. See Kennedy, supra note 95, at 145. The punishment of blacks, however,
did not mean that miscegenation statutes stopped functioning to enforce endogamy solely
among whites. Since miscegenation statutes permitted blacks to marry members of
nonwhite racial minority groups, the state obviously was not concerned with ensuring
that blacks married only other blacks. Rather, blacks were being punished for playing
their part in corrupting the blood of the white race. The state was still seeking to enforce
the norm of endogamy among whites. Moreover, a significant reason why blacks were
punished more harshly after the Civil War was because of federal civil rights statutes that
required racial neutrality in the law. See id. Extralegal punishment such as lynching was
used to punish black men for transgressing the limits on interracial intimacies. See
HODES, supra note 102, at 1-2 (discussing the use of lynching).
104. Id.
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To prevent whites from being influenced by racial equality norms to
grant blacks social equality, racial segregation and miscegenation laws
operated in tandem to systematically enforce white endogamy.
B.

White Racial Endogamy and the Segregation of Public Schools

Racial segregation in public schools was an important means of
instilling in white children the value of racial endogamy. While
segregationists thought it was necessary to regulate the desires of all
whites, they had special concerns about white children. Segregationists
believed that white children were the key to preserving the white race,
and that the only way to learn the importance of this goal was to develop
a sense of racial pride and consciousness. 105 For segregationists, this
required the strict segregation of white children in all facets of social
interaction, but especially in public schools. 106
In an article written shortly after the Supreme Court had decided
Brown, segregationist Herbert Ravenel Sass defended racial segregation
in public schools, declaring that "the elementary public school is the
most critical of those areas of activity where the South must and will at
all costs maintain separateness of the races." 107 This was because
segregation in public schools was the primary state-sponsored social
arrangement aimed at preventing the formation of interracial
marriages. 108
To understand how racial segregation in public schools operated as
a miscegenation tool, it is useful to re-examine the 1925 Mississippi
Supreme Court decision in Rice v. Gong Lum, which explained the
policies underlying state-enforced racial segregation in public schools. 109
The Mississippi State Constitution required that public schools segregate
whites and colored people. 110 The Gong Lum court had to determine
whether a Chinese American girl born in the United States should be
required to attend the all-white or the all-black public school. 111 The
court held that she was "colored" for constitutional and statutory

105. See Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC,
Nov. 1956, at 45, 45-46, 48 ("Race preference is one of those instincts which develop
gradually as the mind develops and which, if taken in hand early enough, can be
prevented from developing at all.").
I 06. See id. at 48.
107. Id.
108. See id.
I 09. I 04 So. 105 (Miss. 1925).
110. Id. at 107 (quoting MISS. CONST. of 1890, § 207).
11 l. See id. at 106.
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purposes and, therefore, that if she wanted to attend public school, she
had to attend the all-black public school. 112
In reaching its holding, the court relied on Mississippi's
miscegenation statute, which explicitly prohibited marriage between
whites and the "Mongolian race." 113 The court then explained the
underlying purpose of both the segregation and miscegenation statutes
was "to preserve the integrity and purity of the white race." 114 For the
court, "maintain[ing] separate schools and other places of association for
the races" was necessary "to prevent race amalgamation." 115 Moreover,
"[r]ace amalgamation has been frowned on by Southern civilization
always, and our people have always been of the opinion that it was better
for all races to preserve their racial purity." 116
"Race amalgamation" was code for intimate interracial relations
between whites and blacks. In other words, the court believed that the
primary purpose of racial segregation in public schools was to protect
white racial purity by preventing the formation of interracial intimacies
and marriages. 117 The logic of racial segregation as an antimiscegenation
tool can be discerned in the following passage from a speech given by
Tom P. Brady, a Mississippi Circuit Judge, criticizing the ruling in
Brown:
You cannot place little white and negro children in classrooms
and not have integration. They will sing together, dance
together, eat together, and play together. They will grow up
together and the sensitivity of the white children will be dulled.
Constantly the negro will be endeavoring to usurp every right
and privilege which will lead to intermarriage. 118

112. Id. at 110.
113. See id. at 108.
114. Id.
115. Id. at l IO.
ll6. Id.
117. See id. at 108.
118. TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 65 (1955), quoted in Anders Walker,
Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral
Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 401 (l 997); see also
Sass, supra note 105, at 48 (arguing that exposure to other races might encourage racial
integration). The concern that racially integrated schools could eventually destroy the
purity of the white race dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, and was not limited to
the South. In 1860, for example, the California state legislature passed a law which
prohibited racial minority groups, specifically Chinese children, from attending school
with white children. See Joyce Kuo, Excluded, Segregated, and Forgotten: A Historical
View of the Discrimination of Chinese Americans in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L.J. 18 l,
190 (l 998). A California newspaper printed an editorial supporting the segregation law,
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Segregationists worried that white children, who were too young to
have formed a preference for their own race, would never develop racial
pride if they went to school with black children and were taught by
"teachers necessarily committed to the gospel of racial integration. " 119
Interracial relations would then develop, starting with friendships, which
would eventually develop into romantic relations as the children grew
older. 120 Inexorably, these relationships would lead to interracial
marriages, the production of mixed-race children, and ultimately, the
normalization of such relationships. 121 Blacks would then achieve social
equality, the inevitable result of which would be the amalgamation of the
races. 122
White southerners supported racially segregated public schools
because they firmly believed that "the key to the schoolroom door is the
key to the bedroom door." 123 Ironically, the importance of schools as
social spaces for transmitting racial attitudes is reflected in the Brown
Court's observation that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as
to [black childrens'] status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 124 Unlike the Court,
white segregationists were concerned about the social effect of
integration on white children.
The concerns over miscegenation help to explain the tremendously
negative reaction to the Court's decision in Brown. Southerners who
immediately denounced the Brown decision understood that it had

praising the Jaw's ability to "keep our public schools free from the intrusion of the
inferior races." Id. (citing The Public Schools and Colored Children, S.F. EVENING
BULL., Feb. 24, 1858, at 2). It emphasized the antimiscegenation purposes of school
segregating:
If we are compelled to have Negroes and Chinamen among us, it is better, of
course, that they should be educated. But teach them separately from our own
children. Let us preserve our Caucasian blood pure. We want no mongrel
race of moral and mental hybrids to people the mountains and valleys of
California.

Id. (citing The Public Schools and Colored Children, supra).
119. See Sass, supra note 105, at 48.
120. See, e.g., id.; BRADY, supra note 118, at 65.
121. See Sass, supra note 105, at 48.
122. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 56-57.
J23. Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed
Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REY. 255, 268 (2002) (quoting
CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL BARRIER TO AN
INTEGRATED SOCIETY 22 (1976)).
124. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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implications beyond the educational context. 125 They protested the
decision as the "first step in a 'social program for the amalgamation of
the two races."' 126 One Mississippi newspaper reacting to Brown wrote
that "White and Negro children in the same schools will lead to
miscegenation. Miscegenation leads to mixed marriages and mixed
marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race." 127 Professor Serena
Mayeri's study of sex segregation as a remedy for racial segregation
speaks to how strongly white southerners feared the possibilities of
intimacies developing between white and black schoolchildren. 128 If
racial integration in public schools was inevitable, white southerners
were willing to accept racially integrated schools so long as white boys
went to school with black boys, and white girls went to school with black
girls. 129
Once racial segregation is viewed as a tool to enforce white racial
endogamy, it becomes clear how racial segregation in general operated to
prevent interracial marriages. Miscegenation laws may prohibit whites
and blacks from marrying each other, but they cannot prevent the
formation of the romantic connections that lead to the desire to marry. To
ensure that whites would not have the opportunity to develop intimate
relations with blacks, social institutions had to be arranged and organized
to eliminate social spaces where whites and blacks could relate to each
other intimately as social equals. 130 Racial segregation in the public
125. See, e.g., Sass, supra note 105, at 46-47; see also BILBO, supra note 43, at
55 (arguing that racial segregation was necessary to preserve the racial integrity of the
white race).
126. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1482 (2004)
(quoting BRADY, supra note 118, at 64).
127. Id. at 1483 (quoting BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS 204 (Waldo E. Martin ed., 1998)).
128. See Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and
the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187
(2006) (discussing white southerners' adoption of sex segregation in public schools to
prevent interracial intimacies from developing between white and black children of the
opposite sex); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY,
AND ADOPTION 278 n.t (2003) (discussing calls for sex segregated schools as a way to
avoid having white and black children of different genders attend school together);
Robert B. Barnett, Comment, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School
Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 296, 297-98 (1970); Moore v. Tangipahoa
Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969).
129. Mayeri, supra note 128, at 196.
130. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1709. Balkin notes that state and local
governments in the South "inserted themselves into the regulation of almost every facet
of everyday life, including schools, hospitals, cafeterias, recreational facilities,
transportation, public accommodations, bathrooms, and water fountains, even funeral
parlors." Id. Such massive state regulation of the private sphere was done to "maintain
and signify the superior status of whites over blacks." Id.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

482

schools and other spaces was the answer. The segregation of public
accommodations, 131 transportation, 132 restaurants, 133 beaches, 134 and
swimming pools 135 can all be viewed as creating racially exclusive social
spaces as means of enforcing endogamy among whites and reinforcing
their racial superiority over blacks.
C.

The Regulation of White Women's Desires

Segregationists feared that white women would not adhere to the
norm of endogamy, especially given the prevalence of both racial and
gender equality norms around the turn of the twentieth century. In
seeking to control white women's desires through segregation and
miscegenation laws, they simultaneously reinforced norms of white
supremacy and patriarchy. 136
The earliest laws regulating interracial sex often sought to deter
white women from having interracial relationships with black men. 137
While white southerners were more tolerant of white women's
relationships with black men during slavery, white male anxiety over
such relationships increased dramatically several years after the end of
Reconstruction. 138
In studying miscegenation law-enforcement patterns in Alabama
between 1880 and 1900, historian Charles Robinson concluded that
interracial relationships between white women and black men were
treated more severely than relationships between white men and black
women. 139 Records show that, from 1880 to 1900, sixty-one people were
incarcerated for having entered into interracial marriages 140-thirty-one
were white, 141 and thirty were black. 142 White women, however, were
131. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
132. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
133. See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
134. See Dawson v. Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
135. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
136. See Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial
Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1321 (2006).
137. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 95, at 1995.
138. Cf HODES, supra note 102, at 1-2 ("Scholars agree that the most virulent
racist ideology about black male sexuality emerged in the decades that followed the Civil
War, and some historians have recognized that the lynching of black men for the alleged
rape of white women was comparatively rare in the South under slavery.").
139. See CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 67-68 (2003).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 69 tbl.1, 71 tbl.3.
142. See id. at 70 tbl.2, 72 tbl.4.
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convicted more often than white men-nineteen white women compared
to twelve white men. 143 Black men were convicted more often than black
women-twenty black men compared to ten black women. 144
In looking at the average length of sentences, Robinson discovered
that black men received the longest sentences, averaging a prison term of
3.84 years. 145 Next were white women, with an average sentence of 3.27
years. 146 White men were sentenced to an average of 3.11 years, 147 while
black women were sentenced to an average of 2.75 years. 148 Most
pardons went to white men and black women 149-of fifteen pardons,
while black women and white men each received ten pardons in total,
black men received four and a white woman received only one. 150
As Robinson's study suggests, the former slave states found that
white woman-black man relationships were the most threatening to the
established racial and gender hierarchies. 151 As a result, southerners used
both legal and social means to regulate the desires of white women. In
addition to legal measures, "white women who consorted with black men
were subject to whipping, maiming, and murder." 152 When white women
voluntarily associated with black men, they were accused of being
depraved and of having low character and morals. 153 White women were
called "strumpets" and "unchaste." 154
In the early twentieth century, as women began to win certain civil
and political rights, concerns over the desires and behavior of white
women increased, resulting in passage of miscegenation laws aimed at
restricting the liberties of white women and preventing them from
entering into intimate relationships with black men. 155 As historian Lisa
Lindquist Dorr contends, the passage of Virginia's Racial Integrity Act
of 1924 "reflected fears of changing gender roles and increasing female

143. See id. at 69 tbl. l, 71 tbl.3.
144. See id. at 70 tbl.2, 72 tbl.4.
145. See id. at 68.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See HODES, supra note 102, at 147.
152. Id. at 165.
153. See id. at 162-63.
154. See id. at 164.
155. See Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at 144 (arguing that Virginia's 1924
miscegenation law "represents a modem, rationalized means of simultaneously
controlling black men and white women" and of "counteracting changes in social and
gender norms").
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sexual agency and independence." 156 In other words, during the early
twentieth century, concerns over miscegenation and the threat to white
racial purity reflected white male anxiety over the claims of equality
made by both white women and blacks. Protecting white racial
patriarchy, therefore, required restricting the liberties of white women so
they did not violate the norm of endogamy. Thus, as Dorr contends, the
proponents of the Racial Integrity Act believed that the new
miscegenation law was necessary because
women, intoxicated by the exciting adventures of youth, might
ignore the opinion of their elders, their traditions, and
ultimately, their racial pride, which, because of the women's
reproductive capacity, was especially important. Away from
parental supervision and protection, these women would be
increasingly vulnerable to the manipulations of new
"confidence men"-men with unknown racial origins seeking
to infiltrate the middle-class white world. 157
John Powell, one of the main advocates of the Racial Integrity Act,
excoriated white women who engaged in relations with black men,
describing them as "deplorable examples of [the] breakdown of racial
pride and decency." 158 Moreover, in vigorously arguing that the
preservation of white racial purity required the "social control of white
women," Powell viewed black male partners as the victims of the
advances and aggressions of white female desire. 159 For Powell,
therefore, all of society, including both the white race and black men,
needed protection from the "sexual depravity" of white women. 160 Even
though the Racial Integrity Act appeared to apply equally to all races and
genders, its proponents believed that it ultimately was about enforcing
the norm of white racial endogamy among white women.
Additionally, it was important to enforce endogamy among white
women to help prevent mixed-race children from being able to gain
membership in the white race. 161 While mixed-race children born to
black women were presumptively identified as black, mixed-race
children born to white women typically remained with the mother in the
white community, and therefore could more easily be passed off as
156. See id. at 150.
157. Id. at 149.
158. Id. at 156.
159. See id. at 159.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 157 ("Mixed-race children of white mothers usually remained in
the white community, thereby increasing the likelihood that they would [pass as whites]
and marry whites.").
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white. 162 Thus, to prevent mixed-race children from obtaining the
benefits of whiteness, under the "Certificates of Racial Composition"
provision of Virginia's Racial Intergrity Act, new white mothers were
required to register the race of their child with the state. 163 If a white
woman was discovered to have given birth to a mixed-race child, the
state would send her a letter condemning her and her child. 164 Thus, the
Act, by providing a mechanism to identify mixed-race children born to
white women, provided a way of enforcing social segregation and
preventing nonwhite children from freely mixing with white children.
The mixed-race child was "immediately branded as nonwhite" and thus
prevented "from benefiting from the privileges of their whiteness." 165
V.

BACK TO LOVING

Understanding that Jim Crow laws regulated white desire has many
important implications for re-thinking our understanding of the Loving
decision and Fourteenth Amendment racial doctrine. The Court in Loving
held that miscegenation laws violated equal protection because the
states' purpose in enacting such laws was to promote white
supremacy. 166 In reaching its conclusion, the Court simply glossed over
the fact that miscegenation laws injured whites as well as blacks by
preventing a white person from marrying a person of another race. Thus,
the question raised-but never answered-in Loving was how a law

162.
I 63.
I 64.

See id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50 (1960).
Lindquist Dorr reproduced such a letter:

Dear Madam,
We have report of the birth of your child, 30 July I 923, signed by Mary
Gilden, midwife. She says that you are white and that the father of the child is
white.
We have a correction to this certificate sent to us from the City Health
Department at Lynchburg, in which they say that the father of the child is
negro.
This is to give you warning that this is a mulatto child and you cannot pass it
off as white. A new law passed by the last legislature says that if a child has
one drop of negro blood in it, it cannot be counted as white. You will have to
do something about this matter and see that the child is not allowed to mix
with white children, it cannot go to white schools and can never marry a
white person in Virginia.
It is an awful thing.
Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at I 53.
165. Id.
166. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, I I (1967).
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could promote white supremacy and the interests of whites if the law
actually violated the liberties of whites as well.
Thinking of miscegenation laws as laws enforcing endogamy
among whites helps to support and deepen the meaning of the Loving
Court's decision. First, it explains why the Virginia statute only
prohibited interracial marriages between whites and racial minorities, but
permitted racial minorities to intermarry with other racial minorities. The
statute created a legal duty only for whites to practice endogamy.
Second, the white race enforced endogamy among its members as a
means of reinforcing its identity as a superior race and of maintaining its
dominant position in the racial-caste social system. In holding that
miscegenation statutes were imperrnissibly designed to maintain white
supremacy, the Loving Court was essentially concluding that a racial
group cannot use the power of the state to preserve an identity infused
with racist notions of superiority or to preserve its political, economic,
and cultural power over other racial groups.
Ultimately, then, miscegenation and segregation laws reinforced the
superiority of the white race and the inferiority of the black race. The
regulation of white desire was a crucial part of the white supremacist
project of protecting the structures of a racially hierarchical society in
which whites remained the "master race" and blacks and other racial
minorities constituted the "slave race." 167
Thus, when the Court declared that Virginia's prohibition on
interracial marriages between whites and racial minorities violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, it could not have been saying that Richard
Loving was denied equal protection. Clearly, Richard suffered serious
injury because he was deprived of the liberty to marry the woman he
loved. 168 But, as a member of the white race, the law was designed to
promote the superiority of his racial group in a racial-caste society.
Richard's harm is best understood as an infringement of his fundamental
right to marry, and not as a denial of equal protection.
The statute, however, not only violated Mildred's fundamental right
to marry, it also denied her, as a member of the black community, equal
protection of the laws because the state was using its power to reinforce
the inferiority of her racial group. By ensuring that Richard did not
breach his legal duty to practice endogamy, the miscegenation statute
preserved the superior status and power of all whites over all blacks. In
the end, Virginia violated Richard's substantive due process right to

167. See generally BILBO, supra note 43, at 82-93 (arguing that white superiority
over blacks was inherent and therefore blacks must continue to be denied social equality
with whites).
168. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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marry in order to deny the entire black community and all of its members
the equal protection of the laws.
The Loving Court got it right. The miscegenation law was
appropriately subject to strict scrutiny because the case ultimately was
about invidious discrimination against blacks, a suspect class. The Court
just needed to be more explicit about the way that the legal enforcement
of white endogamy violated equal protection for blacks.
In Loving, the Court rejected Justice Harlan's notion that the white
race is and should continue to view itself as the dominant and superior
race in the country. Rather, the Court recognized that whites, blacks, and
other racial groups are all equal with respect to civil, political, and social
rights. Therefore, any laws enacted to perpetuate the racial superiority of
one group over another group are fundamentally inconsistent with the
169
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Realizing that miscegenation laws regulated white desire deepens
our understand of how systems of racial subordination operate. Too
much mainstream race discourse accepts simple views of racial
discrimination that fail to recognize the complex ways in which these
systems work. We need to first learn how subordination operates in order
to determine how the law can best dismantle it. To that end, this Article
has sought to illuminate how segregationists used miscegenation and
segregation laws to regulate whites and their desires in order to preserve
a social regime structured to protect the superiority of the white race.
This analysis raises several questions about the nature of racial
inequality today, forty years after Loving was decided. We still have a
racially stratified nation with deep, entrenched inequalities between
whites and blacks. 170 If interracial marriages were viewed as so
threatening to white supremacy, then why haven't interracial marriages
had the effect that segregationists feared that they would have? In 2007,
the complete mongrelization of the South and of the United States does
not seem likely to happen anytime soon. Did segregationists and the
Loving Court overstate the relationship between miscegenation laws and

169. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 (1967); see also Garrett Epps, The
Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 175, 180 (2004) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to prevent
former white slaveowners from being able to exploit blacks to maintain their political and
economic power).
170. See generally John A. Powell, Dreaming of a Self Beyond Whiteness and
Isolation, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 13 (2005) (arguing that whiteness and racial
hierarchy continue to exist today despite the invalidation of miscegenation and
segregation laws).
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the preservation of whiteness? Are high rates of interracial marriages
even necessary to achieve true racial equality? Is there any constitutional
problem if today, various racial groups practice endogamy to some
extent? We must explore these questions if we are to better understand
how systems of racial hierarchy operate. Only then will we know how to
dismantle them.

